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AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION PROJECT oN MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 
(TENTATIVE DRAFT). Recommended by the Advisory Committee on 
the Criminal Trial. Chicago: American Bar Association. 1967. Pp. 
x, 78. Paper, $2. 
At long last the lowly guilty plea is coming into its own. This 
slim booklet, one of a series issued as a result of the American 
Bar Association (ABA) Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice has come to grips with many of the complex, difficult, and 
little understood issues in the guilty plea system of criminal justice. 
It does this well; it ducks no controversies, it successfully avoids 
both the righteousness and the naivete which often characterize 
model-policy attempts to bridge gaps between ideal and real, and 
it attempts to maximize the administrative efficiency of the guilty-
plea process while strengthening its procedures. It defines impor-
tant issues and attempts to resolve such controversial matters as 
whether a defendant's guilty plea is an appropriate consideration 
in determining sentencing leniency and whether plea bargaining 
should be recognized as proper. Considering the operational im-
portance of the guilty-plea process and the crucial issues hidden 
within it, this book is long overdue. 
In legal writing, appellate court opinions, legislative attention, 
and public awareness, the guilty plea has always been overshadowed 
by its counterpart, the criminal trial, particularly the jury trial. 
The dominance of the trial is understandable. After all, the 
trial is more than a mere forum for finding fact; it is the em-
bodiment of procedural justice in a democratic society. The trial 
has everything-drama, ritual, precision, visibility, balance, and, 
above all, transcendent meaning. Little wonder that the relatively 
anonymous, quick, and often drab guilty plea has been ignored 
by scholars, policy makers, and the public. What great constitutional 
issues are posed by the typical case in which a shabby burglar, caught 
in the act, replies "guilty" to the question of the court? Who ever 
heard of Perry Mason "copping out" a client? 
Until recently, the guilty plea was dismissed from serious con-
sideration because of certain presumptions about the defendant who 
pleads guilty and about the procedures used to effect his conviction. 
The defendant, often not represented by counsel but somehow se-
cure in the knowledge of his own guilt, could "voluntarily and 
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understandably" confess, not to a set of facts but to the words of 
a formal charge in a brief court ceremony, thereby standing con-
victed just as surely as if he had been found guilty by judge and 
jury after a trial. The procedure of pleading guilty has been ex-
cluded from substantive consideration on the grounds of a number 
of "simplies": it is "simply" a waiver of trial; it is "simply" a form 
of confession; it is "simply" a formal record-making device impor-
tant primarily because it enables the guilty defendant to move 
speedily from the jail to the prison. The hypothetical guilty-plea 
defendant could be characterized as a "knowledgeable, guilty, and 
consenting man" who is also prudent because by saving the state 
the expense of proof he can hope for mercy from the sentencing 
judge. 
The trouble is that in practice the guilty plea is not a simple 
alternative to trial. In fact, it is a complex procedure which involves 
subtle and difficult issues, such as the operational meaning of re-
quiring a plea to be made "freely," "voluntarily," and "understand-
ingly." There is also a basic question of whether the plea system 
really does separate the guilty from the innocent in a manner that 
is trustworthy and fair. Must the guilty plea be accurate? That is, 
must the defendant have engaged in the conduct to which he ad-
mits, and, if so, how is this determined? Is a defendant properly 
convicted if, although factually guilty of the crime, he is led to be-
lieve that he will be "treated" for his criminality when in fact such 
treatment consists solely of imprisonment? The broad range of issues 
related to the guilty plea itself is infinitely expanded by considera-
tion of the very common practice of plea bargaining. Negotiation 
for charge or sentencing concessions in exchange for pleas of guilty 
raises issues of fairness and equal protection which have rarely been 
confronted by appellate courts and are virtually unrecognized in 
legislation. 
The guilty-plea process, including negotiation, is of great ad-
ministrative significance. Most persons convicted of crimes are con-
victed in this manner. In fact, court calendars, prosecutors' work-
loads, and even police tactics have come to rely on a high, steady 
percentage of guilty pleas. Among other things, the guilty plea 
means assured conviction, a result which cannot be predicted 
at trial even with the most carefully prepared prosecutorial effort. 
Not only is the plea certain and efficient, but from the law enforce-
ment-prosecution point of view, it avoids some sticky questions 
about the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence. The guilty plea 
is more than a waiver of the time and effort involved in a trial; it 
is also a waiver of inquiry into the tactics and discretion of police 
and prosecutor. In daily operation such efficiency and avoidance of 
confrontation are worthy of the encouragement provided by sen-
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tencing leniency and charge reduction, and in most jurisdictions 
these are forthcoming through a tradition of leniency or through 
bargaining, or both. 
The guilty-plea does not exist and is not encouraged solely be-
cause it is efficient. It is also an important way of introducing 
leniency into what would otherwise be a semiautomatic process of 
conviction turning solely on questions of proof and the degree to 
which the legislature has limited the sentencing discretion of the 
judge. Thousands of individuals, each technically guilty of the same 
statutory charget pour into the courts every year. Some jurisdictions 
give judges wide sentencing discretion so that the different back-
grounds and potential of these individuals may be taken into ac-
count. Other jurisdictions limit this sentencing discretion or 
deny it altogether for persons convicted of certain offenses. When 
confronted by defendants who are probably guilty as charged 
but for whom the conviction label seems unduly harsh or the 
mandatory sentence excessively severe, courts can and do use ac-
commodations in the plea process to achieve a form of equity. 
Thus, the other side of the efficiency coin is the individualization 
of criminal justice by merging the charging, adjudicatory, and sen-
tencing decisions into a single determination that seems best to fit 
a particular defendant or a particular set of circumstances. 
As important and complex as it is, the pleading process has re-
mained almost invisible to all except those directly involved. The 
guilty plea, until recently, has not made law; rather, it has avoided 
doing so. Agonizing trial-system issues-sufficiency, relevancy, and 
exclusion of evidence, scope of discovery, use of the insanity or 
entrapment defenses, access to counsel, and the relationship of fair 
trial and free press-have all been avoided by resort to the quick 
and comparatively anonymous arraignment where the guilty plea is 
tendered. Many of these issues become the basis of plea negotiation, 
and occasionally they arise on appeal of a guilty-plea conviction, 
but the majority of guilty-plea defendants have proceeded through 
the courts to prison or probation and beyond without rocking the 
boat. 
Things have changed rather suddenly. The trumpet of Gideon 
has sounded in cellhouses from San Quentin to Sing Sing; the leit-
motif of defendants' rights, carried over in Escobedo, Miranda, and 
other recent decisions, has brought new visions of freedom to pris-
oners convicted by their own pleas as well as to those convicted after 
trial. The issues raised by defendants appealing convictions by plea 
are often the same as those alleged by defendants committed after 
trial, although in some cases they are unique to the guilty-plea sit-
uation. Collectively, these allegations indicate that the process of 
pleading guilty is indeed different from its idealized form. They 
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tell of quick justice, dishonored bargains, bargains made and hon-
ored but involving a plea that was "induced" and hence not volun-
tary, lack of awareness of plea negotiation possibilities, lack of oppor-
tunities to bargain, failure to understand the consequences of the 
plea, and sentence severity when leniency after a plea is the norm. 
Some guilty-plea appellants claim innocence; others merely raise 
questions concerning the relationship of conviction under trial 
standards to conviction by plea. The bases for these petitions, some 
of which are far-fetched and others difficult to document, certainly 
require an examination of guilty pleas as part of a process and not 
merely as a series of unique and unrelated acts.1 
Prisoner appeals are not the sole basis for the intensity of cur-
rent interest in the guilty-plea process. Conviction by plea has been 
one focus of research and analysis in the ABA's recent survey of 
criminal justice administration.2 The administrative significance of 
the guilty plea has been a topic of various sentencing conferences 
held by the federal judiciary.3 Furthermore, increased participation 
of the bar in criminal cases following Gideon has made the guilty 
plea of practical concern to an increasing number of lawyers. Those 
formulating model sentencing codes have had to face the problems 
of inequities which are carried over from conviction to sentencing 
even where great sentencing flexibility is given to the trial judge. 
For example, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code con-
tains a provision for charge reduction after a guilty plea if, in the 
opinion of the court, the prescribed sentencing limits are too harsh.4 
Whatever combination of factors is responsible, the guilty-plea 
process is presently emerging from near obscurity to a position of 
prominence among persons interested in, responsible for, or affected 
by the administration of criminal justice. It is becoming increasingly 
apparent that a balance must be struck between the proper stan-
dards for treatment of individual defendants and the ease of what 
has been an informal, nearly invisible but efficient system for pro-
I. For an e.xample of a court coping with this problem, see Shelton v. United 
States, 242 F.2d 101, rev'd on rehearing en bane, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 356 U.S. 
26 (1957) (making no comment on confession of error by Solicitor General). See also 
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Anderson v. 
North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963); Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 
308 (D. Ore. 1963); State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964). 
For cases and comments about issues raised by guilty-plea appellants and the way 
courts have responded to them, see Comment, Official Inducements To Plead Guilty: 
Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 167 (1964); Note, Guilty Plea 
Bargaining: Compromises b)• Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, II2 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
865 (196!). 
2. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE "\VITHOUT 
TRL\L (1966). 
3. Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1962); Pilot In-
stitute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231 (1960). See also Note, The Influence of the Defen-
dant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956). 
4. Model Penal Code, § 6.12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
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cessing cases through conviction and sentencing. This issue is neither 
new nor peculiar to the adjudicatory stage of the criminal process. 
Recent Supreme Court directives in cases involving confessions and 
searches and seizures have resulted in widespread publicity about a 
similar problem at the investigatory stage of the process. In these 
areas, reactions have tended to become polarized around the an-
guished protests of police agencies and the applause of civil liber-
tarians. Actually, at any stage of the criminal process, such positions 
are too simplistic. For example, in confronting plea bargaining or 
sentencing leniency for guilty-plea defendants, strong polar posi-
tions are occasionally stated which either ignore other facets of the 
problem or call for response in kind. Arguing that guilty pleas 
should not be "bartered" is righteous enough, but the position 
stands at odds with long-standing administrative practices. On the 
other hand, contending that a defendant who has pleaded guilty 
should be treated no differently from one who has "merely exer-
cised his constitutional right to trial" sounds proper enough but it 
leads to equally proper-sounding reasons for differentiating between 
defendants at sentencing such as "confession is the first step on the 
road to reform."5 
The ABA Minimum Standards Committee was confronted with 
strong disagreements about the propriety of current guilty-plea prac-
tices, and it had only scattered appellate court opinions and a modi-
cum of research for guidance; nevertheless, it set out to resolve value 
questions in the guilty-plea process by dealing with all parts of it 
at once. Seeking to retain the administrative advantages of the 
guilty plea while correcting errors or inequities in its use, the Com-
mittee defined its basic task as an "attempt ... to formulate pro-
cedures which will maximize the benefits of conviction without trial 
and minimize the risks of unfair or inaccurate results" (p. 3). The 
theory is that the process of negotiation can be controlled and made 
tolerable if procedural change can insure more accurate pleas, if 
all defendants can be afforded an equal opportunity to engage in 
plea bargaining, and if records can be kept of all guilty-plea pro-
ceedings including bargaining. The Committee's specific proposals 
are embodied in a series of policy statements, in the form of proce-
dural requirements, which deal with basic questions of the propriety 
of plea practices as well as the techniques of registering convictions. 
Among the Committee's recommendations are the following: 
Accuracy of the Plea. The judge is required to inquire into the 
factual basis of the plea whether or not a plea bargain has been 
made (Standard 1.6). 
5. See particularly the discussion at the federal sentencing conference. Pilot Insti-
tute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231 (1960). 
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Plea Bargaining. Negotiation practices are recognized as proper, 
and an attempt is made to set guidelines for, and limits upon, the 
roles of the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the trial judge in 
the bargaining process (Standards 3.1-.3). 
Quick Justice. The Committee recommends a statute or court 
rule to set a period of time for deliberation before a plea can be 
accepted in cases involving serious crimes. In addition to avoiding 
overly swift processing, one stated objective for this time lag is to 
give the defendant an opportunity for plea negotiation discussions 
(Standard 1.3). 
Record of Bargaining. If an agreement on a plea has been 
reached, the Committee recommends that a record be made of this 
agreement. It is further suggested that if a bargain involves a 
promise by the prosecutor to "recommend" leniency, the defendant 
be warned that prosecutor's promises are not binding on the judge 
(Standards 1.5, 1.7). 
Sentencing Leniency. The Committee approves procedures where-
by the court may consider a guilty plea as a positive factor in deter-
mining whether to exercise leniency in sentencing (Standard 1.8). 
Equal Protection. A requirement is imposed that "[s]imilarly 
situated defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement op-
portunities" [Standard 3.l(c)]. 
Withdrawal of the Plea. The Committee recommends that the 
defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea if the agreed-upon 
charge or sentence concessions have not been carried out. No alle-
gation of innocence is required; the defendant need only prove that 
the bargain was not kept [Standard 2.l(a)(4)(iii)]. 
The commentaries in support of these proposals are well docu-
mented and carefully 1vritten. They exhibit a sophisticated aware-
ness of current problems in both the law and practice of pleading 
guilty. Whether or not one agrees with each of the value judgments 
reached in formulating these proposals, articulating them as mini-
mum standards represents an important step in shifting considera-
tion of guilty-plea issues to a level of visibility where they can be 
given the debate and analysis they deserve. This set of standards 
does not encompass all of the issues inherent in the guilty plea pro-
cess and is by no means the final answer to the proper nature and 
status of the guilty plea. However, it is a masterful beginning. It 
is unfortunate that the issues dealt with in this book were not also 
given specific and detailed analysis in the companion volumes: Pro-
viding Defense Services; Post-Conviction Remedies; Appellate Re-
view of Sentences; and Speedy Trial. No doubt this is the price of 
simultaneous but segmented draftsmanship. Some of the suggestions 
for minimum procedural standards, while an improvement upon 
common practices, will require further detailed development if they 
are to accomplish their stated objectives. In determining the accu-
racy of the plea, for example, it is proposed that the court be re-
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quired to make "such inquiry as may satisfy it" that there is a 
factual basis for the plea (Standard 1.6).6 Although this is a fine 
statement of a desired end, it leaves much unanswered as a guide-
line; it fails to suggest, for example, the proper scope of the inquiry, 
or the relationship of evidence discovered during this investigation 
to the standards of relevance, sufficiency, and admissibility of evi-
dence which apply to conviction at trial. Counsel for the defendant 
is treated briefly: legal counsel must be offered, but can be waived; 
the lawyer should not strike a bargain without the consent of his 
client (Standards 1.3, 2.3). Reference is made to the value of counsel 
in plea negotiation, but the question of what new or different skills 
counsel may need for competence in this setting is still open. Fur-
thermore, the ethical problems faced by counsel in plea negotiation 
remain uncharted. The trial lawyer can rightfully claim his duty 
is to provide "the best possible defense" for his client. Can this be 
translated to the guilty-plea situation as a duty to obtain the "best 
possible deal"? 
There are many issues in the guilty-plea process which were 
beyond the scope and intent of the ABA project but which are sug-
gested by it. These issues will eventually have to be confronted 
and resolved. For the present, however, the proposed set of mini-
mum standards is provocative enough. The skill of the analysis and 
integration which underlies these proposals, and the fact that the 
book confronts and attempts to resolve important value conflicts, 
makes this particular ABA publication a model effort in the creation 
of model standards. 
Donald ]. Newman, 
Professor of Criminal Justice, 
State University of New York, Albany 
6. This is consistent with the recent revision of FED. R, CRIM. P. 11. 
